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tinuances of any civil case without consent of the
Court. It is recognized that the pre-trial Justice will
grant some latitude concerning continuances at pretrials, but once the case has left the pre-trial calendar,
the rules of Court specifically provide that postponements may not be granted except for cause arising
after the completion of pre-trial and not due to fault of
the parties or their attorneys. (Sec. 6 Rule 222.)
The Court has felt it imperative to the clearing up
of the calendar that continuances of cases on the readyfor-trial calendar should not be granted except under
unusual conditions. As we have endeavored to stress,
all jurisdictions have found pre-trial procedure has
been effective only where the final trial has followed
the completion of the pre-trial within a period of not
longer than from two to four weeks.
After pre-trial, the Court may find it necessary to
permit amendments to pleadings. Of course provision
for amendments after trial is made by the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. But amendments after pretrial are to be discouraged. The time for making
amendments is at pre-trial and the policy of the Court
will be to permit them only where it would be unjust
or harsh to do otherwise.
Between September 18th and October 2nd, 1939,
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there should be pre-tried a sufficient number of cases
to start off six Justices of our Court who are assigned
to conduct final trials of civil cases. This is not easy
to accomplish. But it can be done if you will continue your fine cooperation with the Court. Notice for
pre-trial hearings for the first several days already have
been sent to counsel. May I ask that when you receive
these notices, you will set about in earnest to prepare
your cases for pre-trial, discuss possible settlements
with your clients and come to Court with full knowledge of your cases and with power to act. If you
do so, the program of the Court will not drag. The
importance of the program has been stressed. Its initiation has resulted after hard work in preparation.
Moreover, it has been interesting to note the extent
that Judges and counsel in other States have made
inquiries of our Court with regard to our program,
and it is believed that if through a continuance of the
fine spirit of cooperation which already has been manifested between Court and counsel in this City, the
dockets of our Court are aided, and litigants, counsel
and witnesses are benefited, a contribution to the cause
of justice will be made not only here but in other parts
of our country where pre-trial procedure and improvements in the Courts are being given consideration.
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con"That man never speaks without adding to the sum
of human ignorance." Such.a person has his place
even in the halls of Congress. The presence of at least
one such on a program of the Fourth Judicial Conference is, I maintain, an essential blessing. For nothing
is so enervating as exposure to unremitting intelligence
without a break or cut-off. Indeed, it may be that my
invitation from Judge Parker, who is sensitive to the
necessity of balance in any program, was motivated by
some such consideration. That the incandescent brilliance of the Judiciary and of the Bar be diffused to a
more gentle candle glow by a kindly haze of academic
innocence may be what he had in mind for me. His
suggestion of a topic, at any rate, is consistent with
this idea. For if one will scratch the surface of the
simple language of Rule 14, on third party practice,
and push down to the cluster of brain-twisting combinations and variations which lie beneath, he will find,
I believe, a power to perplex nowhere surpassed in the
whole body of the Rules. Within the allotted minutes
I could not so much as hint at these more complex
problems, even if this were the thing to do. That it is
obviously not the thing to do releases me to point up
one or two features of the practice which, if they are
less recondite, are, however, not less important.
Since it is the plaintiff who starts a law suit, traditional procedure, both common law and code, has
*Address delivered at the Conference of the Fourth Judicial Circuit at Asheville. N. C.

assumed that he alone should be allowed to run the
show as he pleases. Thus if a plaintiff is damaged by
the joint tort of two persons, he may sue both or either
alone, securing a joint or a several judgment which
he may execute as and when he pleases. Or, having
sued both, he may drop one at a time or request the
jury to ignore the presence of one and to bring in a
verdict against the other. What Mr. Chitty has been
pleased to call this "right" of the plaintiff to proceed
thus is simply the description of an exclusive control
of the law suit accorded by a system which at the same
time permits no sharing of that prerogative of control
by those on the defendant's side of the case. That a
defendant jointly alleged to be responsible to a plaintiff
should be entitled to have his brother in the act present
in the adjudication of his own liability, if that presence
inconveniences neither plaintiff nor the court too
greatly, would seem to be procedurally salutary. And
to tell the truth, that one joint tort feasor should be
denied the right of contribution is a principle which
has more historical respectability than it has good sense
or fairness. Rules of procedure, however, have nothing to say about this substantive injustice of the nocontribution principle. But the England which in 1799
had originated the rule of no-contribution between joint
tort feasors did in the last half of the next century set
up a third party practice by which those defendants
who could be made to contribute might be brought in
by a defendant sued alone. And this procedural start
has carried the third party practice device into the
framework of several of our own states, notably New
York. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Those of yon who
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are familiar with admiralty practice know of the comparable device embraced in the present Rule 56.
It is against this historical background that the
third party practice of Rule 14 gains meaning. The
Rule has been discussed at this and other conferences
though I observe that it has evoked less discussion
than a great many of the other less complicated provisions. But be that as it may, an attempt to re-mirror
these discussions would be as out of place here as it
would be tiresome. And I shall make no effort to do
this. This is certainly not the place to attempt a prolonged analysis of the many variations and complexities in third party practice permitted by the Rule. These
are sleeping dogs which on this occasion must be allowed to slumber on. I shall only note the implications of a single point or two which seem to be worth
thinking about. The first is an obvious one which,
however, unless it is kept in clear focus may result in
the blurring of interpretations as the procedure is invoked under distinct and differing situations.
Under the Rule there are two classes of defendants made amenable to its terms. They are:
One: A party who "is or may be liable to the
plaintiff." That is to say, whose joinability is in no
sense dependent upon a legal relationship existing between the original defendant (the third party plaintiff)
and the third party defendant. A defendant who proceeds against such a third party under the Rule is in
effect tendering to the plaintiff another defendant with
the suggestion that the plaintiff bring this party within
the arena of the legal fight by an appropriate amendment of his coriiplaint. On the effect of the plaintiff's
declining to amend his complaint so as to bring within
the framework of his complaint the third party defendant, I shall have a word or two in a moment.
When directed against a third party defendant
"who is or may be liable to the plaintiff," what is the
test for determining whether the third party complaint
shall be allowed? It was recently stated by Judge
Luhring of the District of Columbia District Court, in
the case of Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,
26 F. Supp. 715. The facts in this case are these:
The plaintiff, while riding on a Maryland highway in
an automobile with a boy whose father was insured
by the defendant insurance company, received personal
injuries in an accident in which the son was killed. It is
stated that Maryland has no family car doctrine, so the
plaintiff's claim was against the deceased, not his father,
and by the Maryland statute it had to be asserted within
six months. No action was brought by the plaintiff
within the statutory period and she now sues the company which had the liability insurance on the car in the
District on a double-barreled complaint: (1) that the
defendant had orally agreed that if the plaintiff would
not file suit it would pay her claim for injuries; and
(2) that by reason of the insurance company's fraudulent representation the plaintiff had been induced to
abandon her suit against the deceased in Maryland.
Before answering, the insurance company moved
for leave to make plaintiff's attorney a party. Leave
was granted and summons and third party complaint
were filed. It was alleged in the third party complaint
that plaintiff's failure to sue within the statutory period
was due to her attorney's negligence and if there were
any liability to the plaintiff, it was that of her attorney,
not the casualty company.
The third party defendant moved to dismiss the
third party complaint on the ground that "the claim
set forth in the third party complaint against him is
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different from the claim set forth in the declaration"
and therefore the third party procedure under Rule 14
was inapplicable.
The court overruled this motion, however, saying
in effect that whether or not the claim asserted against
the original defendant and that set out in the third
party complaint are the same or are different is immaterial. If the plaintiff might properly have sued the
third party defendant with the original defendant in the
first instance, then the third party defendant was properly subject to impleader. The court observed that
either the original defendant or the third party defendant is liable to the plaintiff-if one is liable then
the other is not. There is here, then, no legal relationship between the third party plaintiff and third party
defendant. It is obvious that the third party plaintiff
is not seeking contribution from the third party defendant. Indeed, there can be no basis for contribution. What, then, is the foundation for the joinability
of the third party defendant here? Judge Luhring
states it thus:
"If the claim set out in the third party complaint might
have been asserted against the third party defendant had
he been joined originally as a defendant, it follows that
the defendant is entitled, as a third party plaintiff, to bring
in such third party defendant. To determine whether such
a joinder is permissible requires a consideration of Federal
Rules 18, 19 and 20."
The criterion, then, which Judge Luhring invokes
is the simple question whether or not, under Rules 18,
19 and 20 embodying the liberal provisions for joinder
of claims and parties, the plaintiff might in the first
instance have joined the third party defendant (the
plaintiff's lawyer) with the third party plaintiff (the
insurance company). And since the answer was yes,
the third party process was allowed.
The second class of third party defendants embraced within the Rule are those whose presence in the
litigation depends upon the existence of a legal relationship between the original defendant and the third party
defendant. Typical of this class is the right of reimbursement by a surety against a principal; contribution
between joint tort feasors-if by the local statute contribution is permitted-i.e., a joint responsibility or a
secondary responsibility shared by the third party plaintiff and the third party defendant which responsibility
or liability is owed by both either jointly or secondarily,
but owed to the plaintiff.
The test for the joinability of a third party defendant in this context is obviously not the same as that
used in the case just referred to. That this is true is
made abundantly clear by an opinion as yet unreported.
handed down as recently as May 1. The case is Tullgren v. Jasper' and a much too closely edited report of
Judge Chesnut's opinion on the case appeared in the U.
S. Law Week, upon which I must rely. Here the plaintiff, a passenger in a taxicab, was injured in a collision
between the taxicab and a truck. She sued alleging
joint liability on the part of five defendants, as follows:
the taxicab driver, the taxicab owner, an association of
taxicab operators, the driver of the truck, and the
owner of the truck. The defendant association of taxicab operators sought by third party process to implead
the liability of the owner of the truck. The theory of
the third party plaintiff was that if the defendants were
held liable to the plaintiff, then under a Marvland statute the owner of the truck would be liable for contri1. Subsequently reported in 27 F. Supp. 413.-Ed. Note,
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bution and under another Maryland statute the insurer
of the truck owner would be liable if the truck owner
defaulted in making payment. But it should be noted
that there had been no default by the insured and no
refusal to defend by the insurer.
Recourse to the third party process was denied and
support for this ruling was predicated upon an implication drawn from a sentence in the Rule to the effect
"that the third party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's liability." This, it
was said, "seems to imply some direct relationship
either ex delictu or ex contractu between the original
defendant and the third party defendant." And finding "no such relationship," a denial of the third party
process followed.
The concluding sentence of the report of the case
-not a quotation from the opinion-is this:
"The valid objection in the instant case is not the
fact that the insurer is secondarily liable to the insured
but the fact that there is no relationship between the
insurer (the third party defendant) and the association
of taxicab drivers."
Under the criteria suggested by these two cases it
seems clear that a relationship between the third party
defendant and the original plaintiff, or a relationship
between the moving defendant (the third party plaintiff) and the third party defendant-either of these
relationships will support third party process.
To which of these alternatives is the sentence in the
Rule to the effect that "The third party defendant is
bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's
liability to the plaintiff as well as of his own to the
plaintiff or to the third party plaintiff" relevant? It
would seem to be relevant only if the legal status of
these two parties is sufficiently identical as respects the
plaintiff that proof of the plaintiff's allegations will impose liability on both parties alike, as, e.g., a joint tort
or a joint contractual liability. And if liability of the
third party defendant is based upon grounds other than
those originally alleged by the plaintiff (as was the
case, for example, in the Crin case) an adjudication
of the claim against the original defendant will not be
binding upon the third party defendant.
Does it not, then, come down to this? One who is
or may be liable to the plaintiff is amenable to third
party process and obviously the absence of any legal
relationship between the third party plaintiff and the
third party defendant is immaterial. The sole inquiry
is that suggested in the Crim case, namely, whether
the plaintiff could have joined the fhird party defendant in the original suit.
One who is or may be liable to the original defendant (the third party plaintiff) is also amenable
to third party process. And in this class of cases,
represented by the problems raised by the Tullgren
case, the existence of a relationship between the defendants which may support a claim under the Rule is
certainly prerequisite. Thus the criteria for determining the amenability of parties to third party process
vary as the circumstances of the cases invoking this
procedure vary.
Now to recur to the point deliberately passed
over a moment ago. We have noted that the plaintiff
may amend his complaint so as to assert a claim
against the third party defendant. But you observe
that he cannot be compelled to do so. The language of
the Rule is: "The plaintiff may amend his pleadings
to assert against the third party defendant any claim
which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third
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party defendant had he been joined originally as a
But suppose the plaintiff does not so
defendant."
amend. What effect will this have on the litigation?
At the Institute on the Federal Rules held in
Washington Dean, now Judge, Clark, in response to
a question on this point, had this to say:
"It was held in New York, where the citing in may
be only of someone liable to the defendant, that the plaintiff could not make claim against the new person. That
is, it was really only a private fight between the first
defendant and the newly-cited defendant. But we have
tried to make it broader. Nevertheless it is still possible
for the plaintiff to say, 'Well, even though you brought
him in, I am not going to have anything to do with him.
I don't want to make any claim against him. You can
make whatever claim you want, but I refuse to do so.'
That is still permissible, although the probability is that
the plaintiff will say, 'Well, I want to get a complete
judgment, and I will amend and make my claim against
the new party that is brought in'."
The Wisconsin court has held under that state's
third party practice act (somewhat like Rule 14) that
if plaintiff declines to amend, the case resolves itself
into two law suits: (1) that of the plaintiff against
the original defendant, and (2) that of the original
defendant against the third party defendant for contribution-both of which are tried simultaneously. Now
let us suppose a case which might well be a commonly recurring one-plaintiff is injured in a collision of two cars, one belonging to A and one to B.
Plaintiff sues A alone. A proceeds under Rule 14
to bring B into the litigation. A's third party complaint
against B might properly take this form (since alternative pleadings are permissible under the Rule) : (1)
You, B, not I, were negligent in this wreck and your
negligence caused plaintiff's injury; but (2) if I were
also negligent with you I am entitled to contribution
if plaintiff recovers a judgment against me.
Now suppose plaintiff declines to amend his cornplaint so as to assert a claim against B, preferring to
go on dowsn the road in his litigation against A alone.
Does this foreclose A in his claim on the first part of
his third party complaint, namely, that it was B's negligence exclusively that caused plaintiff's injury? The
Rule says that the third party plaintiff may proceed
against a third party defendant who may be liable to
him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him. Does this mean that the original
defendant may shift all the liability for plaintiff's claim
to the third party only if the original plaintiff amends
his complaint? If B does not, he, A, is stymied? Furthermore, if A's third party complaint be allowed to
stand and in the absence of the plaintiff's amendment
the parties go to trial on both features of the third
party plaintiff's claim against the third party defendant, suppose a jury should bring in a verdict against
B alone. Would it be possible for the plaintiff to levy
execution against B thereon? And if not, could it be
argued that plaintiff, having elected to confine his
claim to one against A and having declined to amend
so as to assert a claim against B and having lost his
case against A, would now be precluded from another
day in court on a case against B?
Again on the assumption of the Wisconsin court
that when plaintiff declines to amend, the case is resolved into two law suits: (1) the plaintiff against the
original defendant, and (2) the original defendant
against the third party defendant, suppose a verdict
is rendered in favor of plaintiff against A on the first

THIRD PARTY PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW RULES
phase. This would mean that a separate verdict would
be rendered in favor of A against B for contribution or
reimbursement as the case may be on the second phase.
Suppose it now develops that A is execution-proof.
Will A's judgment against B for contribution support
a direct levy of execution by plaintiff against B for
the whole amount of the debt?
These are a few of the questions which on this
point, it seems to me, may be legitimately raised. There
seems to be nothing explicit in the Rules to point the
answers. Certainly I need not try to give them. It is
judges who must resolve perplexities; I should be content with the lesser and simpler r6le of stating a few
of them.
To ease up with a short footnote to the problem
of third party practice most discussed in conferences,
viz., whether third party practice must proceed in accordance with considerations of jurisdiction and venue
peculiar to the federal courts? You know, of course,
that the answer of the commentators has been quite
generally an unequivocal no! We have their commitments to this effect in the conference reports and
significant also is the absence of any allegation of
jurisdiction in Form 22-that proposed for third party
practice. The ancillary character of this procedure is
assumed to be sufficient to by-pass Strawbridge v. Curtis with its requirement of complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants. And certainly if this
is not so, the scope of third party practice will be
greatly narrowed.
Moreover, recent judicial sanction of the Committee's position was given in Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (April 3, 1939) in
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which the fact that the third party defendant was a
citizen of the same state as plaintiff-urged as a ground
for dismissing the third party complaint-was said by
judge McClintic to be irrelevant. This is simply to
say that federal jurisdiction once established by virtue
of diversity of citizenship, may not be embarrassed by
the presence of a third party defendant who could not
have been sued in the federal court by the plaintiff
in the first instance. But is it also to say that considerations of jurisdiction and venue may be wholly
ignored? This seems to have been the assumption of
counsel in a case recently before2 judge McLellan of
the Massachusetts District Court.
In judge McClintic's case the objection of the
third party defendant was not that under the federal
venue statute it was not answerable to suit in the
Southern District of West Virginia. It was rather that
federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was destroyed by its presence in the suit since the state of
incorporation of both plaintiff and the third party defendant is West Virginia. But suppose that the third
party defendant had been a citizen of North Carolina,
in which event there would have been present no diversity of citizenship question; but the amenability of
a North Carolina corporation to suit in the District
Court of West Virginia would still remain. This question may be stated in terms of the extraterritoriality
of the West Virginia Court's process, for it is essentially that and nothing more. Rule 4(f) gives validity
to the service of process (other than a subpoena) "anywhere within the territorial limits of the State in which
the district court is held and where statute of the
United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state." In the absence of such United States
statute authorizing service beyond the territorial limits
of the state, it would seem that service of the West Virginia process on an hypothetical North Carolina third
party defendant would run head on into Rule 82
which, of course, denies a construction of the Rules
that would extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue thereof. judge McLellan in
the case referred to, finding "no special statute applicable to third party practice authorizing service of
process in another state," dismissed a third party complaint filed in the Massachusetts District Court against
a Rhode Island corporation which could be served only
in that state. Doubtless a Congressional enlargement
of third party process, making it valid extraterritorially,
would obviate this deficiency, if indeed it be a deficiency. But in the present statutory context the third
party process, at least in this particular, must still respect district court jurisdictional lines.
2. The case is F. & M. Skirt Co. Inc. vs. Wimpfheimer &
Bro. Inc. and was subsequently reported in 27 F. Supp. 239.Ed. Note.
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